Distinctions Matter: Supranational vs. Intergovernmental Rules of the EU’s Defence Game by Weiss, Moritz
Distinctions Matter: Supranational vs.
Intergovernmental Rules of the EU’s
Defence Game
Moritz Weiss 2019-03-26T09:00:49
Complexity and the EU’s defence game
Politics within the European Union (EU) and thus the authoritative allocation of
values are inherently complex processes. There is a myriad of formal ways of how
the EU enacts norms and regulates the Member States’ internal policies. What
is even more important, however, there are multiple informal ways of arriving at
political outcomes. Given this complexity, the distinction between supranational
and intergovernmental rules of the EU game has firmly been established. While
the former rules stress the European Commission’s agenda setting powers and
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the latter are tantamount to
cooperation between sovereign nation states with each maintaining veto power. In
short, supranational and intergovernmental forms of decision-making imply different
actor and power constellations and thus distinct political processes of how the EU
arrives at collectively binding decisions.
Do recent developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) – or
the so-called New Defence Policy (von Achenbach) – imply the need to overcome
these distinctions? To what extent does the Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO), in particular, suggest novel ways and rules of decision-making that are
neither supranational nor intergovernmental? While I share the general view that
the differentiated integration of PESCO shapes a certain middle ground between
the two forms of policy-making, I argue that we should preserve the distinction
between supranational and intergovernmental rules since it still makes a difference
in political life. As long as our distinctions make such a causal difference, they
have merit for our scholarly inquiries. Rather than subsuming policy fields, such
as defence, under one distinct or a new category, we should disaggregate the
domain and investigate, which political outcomes were triggered by which political
processes. Such an analysis will reveal that some defence outcomes are based on
supranational decision-making, while others are decided intergovernmentally.
The premise of this argument is a simple and widespread equation of political
science: preferences + institutions = outcomes. If I thus aimed to show that
supranational vs. intergovernmental rules (or, institutions) matter in the EU’s
defence game, comparing two empirical case studies in which actors’ preferences
remain constant, but policy-making rules differ along the distinction supranational/
intergovernmental, would form a meaningful test. On this basis, I could demonstrate
how varying institutions produced varying outcomes. The issue of how to handle so-
- 1 -
called defence offsets within the EU fulfils this ceteris paribus condition to an extent
that is quite unusual in the social sciences, as I will discuss in what follows.
How to regulate defence offsets?
Offset agreements are a pervasive feature of the defence-industrial sector all around
the world, although they may come under different labels and in different forms.
Some offsets are referred to as ‘industrial participation’ programs or the ‘juste
retour’ principle, but the idea of requiring a compensation for domestic industries
in exchange for importing defence goods from abroad remains basically the same.
In the European Union, as in the rest of the world, offsets have traditionally been
regarded as belonging to the politically sensitive realm of national security. EU
Member States have been cautious not to delegate the regulation of offsets to the
European level. In other words, defence offsets have historically been a national
prerogative. Yet, at the same time, defence offsets are not only market distortions,
but also prone to corruption and increasing the price of defence goods. Therefore,
the question had arisen of how to regulate them.
The intergovernmental pathway and one outcome
On the one hand, governments cooperated among themselves. Defence offsets
were thus addressed within the EU’s intergovernmental setting. With approval of a
Code of Conduct on Offsets (CoCO) on 24 October 2008, the European Defence
Agency (EDA) reached a consensus among all participating governments. This Code
of Conduct aims at increasing transparency and promoting a competitive and robust
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The objective is to
provide a transparent framework, albeit not legally binding, on how to apply defence
offsets as a policy instrument. In other words, the code is supposed to regulate
the appropriate use of offsets, which should, in turn, lead to convergence of offset
practices among participating governments; perhaps even to a reduction of offsets in
the long-term.
In essence, this is a political compromise between governments with heterogeneous
preferences. When we examine the positions of both small and large Member
States, the former have clearly supported the preservation of defence offsets. For
them, it is often the only viable pathway into the global supply chains of the large
prime contractors. By contrast, the large Member States’ positions ranged from
close alignment with the small countries to outright opposition to offsets. Given this
preference constellation, the political outcome, namely a legally non-binding code of
conduct, is fully comprehensible.
The supranational pathway and another outcome
One year later, on the other hand, the same governments with the same preferences
consented to either abolish their offset policies or, at least, limit them in practice. This
is not only a startling outcome, but, in particular, demonstrates the effects of applying
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supranational rules to the EU’s defence game. They not only matter somewhat; they
make a causal difference.
The European Commission pursued a strategy of judicial politics to move member
states beyond their initial preference constellation. It threatened the Member States
with case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and provided governments
with political opportunities to reduce this kind of legal uncertainty. In other words,
supranational rules shaped a distinct outcome.
From 2000 onwards, the European Commission was increasingly dissatisfied with
the stagnation in the development of the European defence market. Thus, it referred
to an almost forgotten judgement of the ECJ, by which the security exemption
of defence procurement was interpreted in a very narrow way (C-414/97). The
Commission indirectly threatened Court-driven integration and sued, for instance,
Italy (C-337/05). Most significantly, it treated arms acquisitions and thus defence
offsets as an instance of market regulation rather than a CSDP issue. This was a
deliberate – and strategic – choice and enabled the application of supranational
rules. The initiative resulted in the EU’s first secondary law on defence procurement.
Yet many Member States were willing to fight over regulating defence offsets and,
therefore, a political compromise was not viable. The directive did simply not mention
defence offsets.
Governments were certain that they had preserved their offset practices – similar to
the non-binding Code of Conduct. This was mistaken, however. The Commission
pushed forward opportunistic enforcement and unilaterally interpreted the directive
by several guidance notes. Among others, it spelled out that defence offsets
would distort markets and would thus violate basic principles of EU law. The
Commission defined the abolishment of offset policies as one of the main criteria
for the directive’s transposition. Those Member States that hesitated to follow the
suggestions were prosecuted for incomplete transposition. 18 Member States
changed their national offset legislation, whereas four of them only complied after
their cases were referred to the ECJ. Given the still heterogeneous preference
constellation among governments, the political outcome, namely a widespread
shift of national offset policies, can only be understood against the backdrop of
supranational rules. In short, the latter made a difference.
Distinctions and policy fields
Today, the EU-wide regulation of defence offsets has evolved from two distinct
trajectories. Not only the pathways, but, in particular, the outcomes varied
dramatically. This variation makes a difference because, in both political processes
the potential drivers and obstacles were largely identical – with just one exception.
Both sets of rules were negotiated and agreed upon by largely the same
autonomy-driven governments. Also profit-driven firms and their national interest
representations accompanied and influenced both outcomes. The crucial difference
was that the code was decided within an intergovernmental setting with a prominent
bargaining position for governments, whereas the ban of offsets was agreed upon
within a supranational context of ECJ case law and Commission politics. As long
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as the rules of the game (or the institutional context) make such a difference, the
distinction adds critical value and should thus be maintained.
Beyond the importance of distinguishing between intergovernmental and
supranational rules of the EU’s defence game, however, this brief illustration
revealed another finding. How do scholars and policy-makers define the boundaries
of policy fields? Where does defence end and the single market begin? Why did the
European Commission treat defence procurement as an instance of security policy in
the 1990s, but as an instance of public procurement in the 2000s? There is nothing
intrinsic to these interpretations, but they have tremendous political implications,
such as those that I explicated above. Hence it is relevant to critically reflect on these
questions and to keep in mind that the boundaries of policy fields are anything but
innocent descriptions of empirical facts. They are genuinely political statements.
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